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CHALLENGING BUCKLEY V. VALEO: A LEGAL STRATEGY 
 
by 
 
John C. Bonifaz, Gregory G. Luke and Brenda Wright* 
 
 
In its 1976 ruling in Buckley v. Valeo,1 the United States Supreme Court 
sanctioned a system of unlimited campaign spending in federal elections.  Since 
that ruling, this nation has witnessed an explosion of political expenditures.  The 
1996 election cycle marked the most expensive election in U.S. history, with 
congressional and presidential candidates spending a total of more than $2 
billion.2  Campaign spending has also dramatically risen in state and local 
elections across the country.3  Unlimited spending poses a serious threat to our 
democratic process.  It undermines public confidence in our elections and in our 
democratic institutions.4  It presents an increased danger of actual corruption as 
large contributors dominate the financing of public election campaigns.5  It 
places enormous time pressures on officeholders running for re-election, 
interfering with their ability to carry out their governing duties.6  It enables 
candidates with wealth or access to wealth to drown out the voices of lesser-
funded candidates and their supporters.7  It violates the promise of political 
equality.8 
 
                                                 
*The writers are, respectively, the executive director, staff attorney and managing editor 
for the National Voting Rights Institute.  
1 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
2 See Ruth Marcus & Charles Babcock, The System Cracks Under Weight of Cash; 
Candidates, Parties and Outside Interests Dropped a Record $2.7 Billion, THE 
WASHINGTON POST , February 9, 1997, at A1. 
3 See Kevin Sack, High Stakes and Higher Antes in Statehouse Races, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES, Sept. 6, 1998, at A24. 
4 See Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to 
Restoring the Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1126, 1126-31 (1994) 
[hereinafter Wertheimer & Manes]. 
5 See id. at 1131-42; see also Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the 
Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 273, 293-97, 326-28 (1993) [hereinafter 
Raskin & Bonifaz]; CHARLES LEWIS & THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, THE BUYING OF 
THE CONGRESS (1998). 
6 See Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why 
Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1281 (1994). 
7 See infra text and accompanying notes 50-51. 
8 Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 5, at 332.. 
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The time has come to revisit Buckley v. Valeo.9  The facts and 
circumstances of unlimited campaign spending have dramatically changed since 
the Buckley ruling.  They now demonstrate the necessity for campaign spending 
limits to protect the integrity of  our electoral process.  New facts now require a 
new review.  As the Supreme Court has stated: 
 
In constitutional adjudication as 
elsewhere in life, changed 
circumstances may impose new 
obligations, and the thoughtful part of 
the Nation could accept each decision to 
overrule a prior case as a response to 
the Court’s constitutional duty.10  
 
This paper will highlight the emergence of a new legal movement for 
challenging Buckley.  It will present the arguments developed in several test 
cases in jurisdictions that have sought to revisit the constitutionality of campaign 
spending limits by enacting and defending mandatory spending limits. 
 
These beginning efforts – from the cities of Cincinnati, Ohio and 
Albuquerque, New Mexico, to the State of Vermont – have been launched with 
the recognition that legal reform may be a long-term project.  In 1937 and again 
in 1951, the Supreme Court upheld the poll tax as constitutional.11  A fee 
charged to voters in order to vote did not, the Court found, violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.12  In 1966, the Court reversed 
its prior rulings.  In the landmark case of Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,13 
the Court held that “the Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political 
theory of a particular era¼Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for 
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change.”14 
 
This article is presented in the spirit of Harper.  Buckley may stand 
today.  But it cannot stand the test of time. 
 
                                                 
9 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
10 Planned Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992). 
11 Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937); Butler v. Thompson, 341 U.S. 937 (1951) 
(mem) (per curiam). 
12 Id. 
13 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
14 Harper, 383 U.S. at 669 (1966) (emphasis added). 
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I.  REVISITING BUCKLEY IN THE STATES 
 
In the twenty-two years since Buckley, the ruling has generated 
significant dissent within and outside of the legal community.  More than 200 
constitutional scholars from across the nation have signed a statement calling 
for the reversal of Buckley’s prohibition on spending limits.15  The attorneys 
general for 26 states and the secretaries of state or chief election officers for 21 
states have gone on record seeking to overturn the ruling.16  Members of 
Congress have introduced eleven bills since 1976 which would establish 
campaign spending limits for federal elections and set the stage for revisiting 
Buckley.17  Thirty-eight U.S. Senators have supported the call for the reversal of 
the ruling.  The White House and the U.S. Justice Department have also 
announced their interest in supporting a test case for revisiting Buckley.18  
Editorialists around the country have joined the call for a new look at the 
constitutionality of spending limits.19 
 
Sparking this growing support for revisiting Buckley are a series of state 
and local initiatives to halt the spiraling influence of money in elections by 
enacting and defending limits on campaign spending.  The case that has 
                                                 
15 See Statement in Support of Overturning Buckley v. Valeo, January 28, 1998 (on file 
with authors). 
16 See Brief in Support of Petition for Certioriari of the States of Arizona, Connecticut, 
Flordia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington and West 
Virginia as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, City of Cincinnati v. Kruse, 142 F.3d 
907 (6th Cir.1998 ); see David Stout, State Attorneys General Urge Limits on Campaign 
Spending, THE NEW YORK TIMES, January 28, 1997, at A14 (noting that 24 state 
attorneys general joined statement in support of City of Cincinnati’s spending limits 
while case was pending before United States District Court).  The Secretaries of State 
or chief election officers of Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin joined the same statement. 
17 See S. 1684, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. (1983); S. 1185, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. (1983); S. 
59, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 2473, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 1456, 
101st Cong. 1st Sess.; H. Res. 168, 103rd Cong. 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 3571, 103rd 
Cong. 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 3651, 104th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1996); H.R. 3658, 104th 
Cong. 2nd Sess. (1996); S. 1057, 105th Cong. 1st Sess. (1997); H.R. 77, 105th Cong. 1st 
Sess. (1997). 
18 See James Bennett, Clinton Pushes Spending Limits for Candidates, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES, June 16, 1997, at B9. 
19 See, e.g., Time to Rethink Buckley v. Valeo, THE NEW YORK TIMES, November 12, 
1998 at A28; A Day in Court for Campaign Reform, THE BOSTON GLOBE, March 17, 
1998 at A12. 
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received the most attention is City of Cincinnati v. Kruse,20 the first test case in 
twenty-two years to address directly the question of the constitutionality of 
campaign spending limits.  Although the Supreme Court recently declined, 
without comment, to hear Cincinnati’s appeal of a lower court ruling enjoining 
the limits, the case has had a significant impact in the support it has generated 
for revisiting Buckley.  It also generated a significant concurring opinion in the 
Sixth Circuit which recognized, for the first time, that Buckley need not be read 
as a per se ban on all spending limits and that state or local jurisdictions might 
be able to justify such limits based on new compelling interests not addressed 
by the Buckley Court in 1976.  Examination of the Kruse case therefore 
provides an important starting point for understanding the legal and factual 
issues involved in the movement to revisit Buckley.  Its lessons will have 
continued application in future anticipated cases defending spending limits in 
Vermont, New Mexico, and elsewhere.  
 
A.  Kruse v. City of Cincinnati 
 
In July 1995, following twenty months of study and deliberation, the 
Cincinnati City Council enacted limits on campaign expenditures in city council 
elections.  The city council set the limits at the level of three times the annual 
salary for a city councilmember, a level of approximately $140,000.  In enacting 
these limits, the city council recognized the Supreme Court’s ruling in Buckley, 
but found that new facts and circumstances associated with campaign spending 
in its local elections demonstrated the necessity for spending limits.  In March 
1996, John R. Kruse, an unsuccessful city council candidate, his political 
committee, and two financial contributors filed suit in federal district court in 
Cincinnati, challenging the limits on Buckley grounds.  The city retained the 
National Voting Rights Institute as special counsel to defend the limits. 
 
Throughout the litigation, the plaintiffs contended that Buckley stands 
for the proposition that all campaign spending limits are per se unconstitutional. 
 The facts, the plaintiffs argued, do not matter.  In so doing, the plaintiffs 
stipulated at the summary judgment stage to any and all facts that the city 
introduced into the record in its defense of the ordinance.  This record included 
the following facts: 
 
· In the past several election cycles, the City of Cincinnati witnessed a 
dramatic rise in the cost of Cincinnati city council campaigns.  The 
highest candidate expenditure for a winning campaign increased by 
more than 480 percent, rising from $75,000 in 1989 to $362,000 in 
1995.  
 
                                                 
20 142 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 511 (1998). 
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· The rise in the overall cost of Cincinnati city council races has 
caused a corresponding rise in the influence of wealthy donors in 
Cincinnati’s elections. From 1991 to 1995, one-third of one percent of 
the metropolitan area’s population provided more than $3.9 million in 
campaign contributions to city council candidates, amounting to nearly 
70% of all the money raised by those candidates. 
   
· The public perception in Cincinnati, shared by an overwhelming 
majority of Cincinnati residents, is that “large campaign contributors 
wield undue influence on the political system.”  That same overwhelming 
majority state that “[t]he amount of money in election campaigns has 
caused [them] to lose a great deal of faith in the political system.”  
Cincinnati residents “firmly believe that their own and others’ level of 
trust in the integrity of the political system has been eroded by the 
amount of money in politics.”   
 
· The rising costs of Cincinnati’s city council campaigns causes city 
councilmembers to spend increasing amounts of time raising money for 
the next election, which interferes with their responsibilities for governing 
the city.  This consequence of unlimited campaign spending further has 
fueled the erosion of public confidence in Cincinnati in its local election 
process and in its local government.   
 
· The system of unlimited campaign spending in Cincinnati city council 
elections has caused a “black-out” phenomenon with respect to 
television advertising time.  The policy of local television broadcasters in 
Cincinnati is to sell television advertising spots on a first-come, first-
serve basis.  Because there is a limited supply of the most valuable 
advertising spots available on local television, city council candidates 
with significant quantities of campaign funds early in a campaign season 
have been able to preempt effectively the right of other, less well-funded 
candidates to purchase such advertising time. 
  
· Candidates for Cincinnati city council can run a viable campaign 
spending less than $140,000, the limit set by Cincinnati’s ordinance.  Of 
the nine winning Cincinnati city council candidates in the 1995 elections, 
four won election spending less than $140,000, including one who spent 
only $33,000 and a challenger candidate who spent $97,000.  
 
Based on this record, the city argued that its limits were justified by the 
compelling governmental interest in preventing corruption and the appearance 
of corruption in the local election process, freeing its elected officials from the 
pressures of fundraising so as to ensure that they are able to carry out their 
representative duties without interference, and preventing some city council 
candidates from blocking other candidates’ access to key television advertising 
5
Bonifaz et al.: Buckley v. Valeo
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2000
 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1 
 
time.  In opposing the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the city further 
argued that this factual record was sufficient, at a minimum, to demonstrate new 
facts and circumstances warranting a trial at which the district court could 
properly weigh the evidence showing the necessity of the limits. 
 
In April 1998, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s January 1997 ruling granting the 
plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and denying the city its opportunity to 
prove its case at trial.  A majority of the Sixth Circuit panel held that, under 
Buckley, Cincinnati’s campaign spending limits were per se unconstitutional 
regardless of what the record might show about the impact of unlimited 
campaign spending.21  The panel further ruled that, were it to consider the 
factual record, the City had not demonstrated that spending limits were 
necessary to prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption in the 
electoral process.22  The panel held that Cincinnati could not rely on the twenty-
two years of federal election experience with contribution limits since Buckley to 
demonstrate that such limits working alone are insufficient to assure the integrity 
of the electoral process.23   The majority acknowledged that the time a 
candidate must spend raising money for her campaign “detracts an officeholder 
from doing her job,”24  but it nonetheless ruled that the interest in reducing the 
time elected officials spend on fundraising “cannot serve as a basis for limiting 
campaign spending.”25 
 
U.S. District Judge Avern Cohn26 issued a concurring opinion.  While 
joining the majority’s affirmance of the District Court’s ruling, Judge Cohn 
disagreed with the majority’s reading of Buckley with respect to campaign 
spending limits:  
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Buckley . . . is not a broad 
pronouncement declaring all campaign 
expenditure limits unconstitutional.  It 
may be possible to develop a factual 
record to establish that the interest in 
freeing officeholders from the pressures 
of fundraising so they can perform their 
duties, or the interest in preserving faith 
                                                 
21 Kruse, 142 F.3d at 915. 
22 Id. at 916. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 917. 
25 Id. 
26 United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by 
designation. 
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in our democracy, is compelling, and 
that campaign expenditure limits are a 
narrowly tailored means of serving such 
an interest.27 
 
In September 1998, Cincinnati filed a petition for certiorari before the 
Supreme Court.  In its petition, the city argued that the Sixth Circuit ruling 
conflicts with Buckley.  In the alternative, the city argued that, if the Sixth Circuit 
correctly read Buckley to hold that all campaign spending limits per se 
unconstitutional, Buckley should now be overruled.  Parts B and C, infra, 
provide an overview of the city’s arguments that its campaign spending limits 
ordinance was narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests and thus 
consistent with the First Amendment.   
 
B.  The Compelling Governmental Interest in Preventing Corruption and the 
Appearance of Corruption Justifies Campaign Spending Limits 
 
In Buckley, the Supreme Court upheld congressional limits on campaign 
contributions in federal elections as justified by the sufficiently important 
governmental interests of preventing corruption and the appearance of 
corruption.28  The Buckley Court specifically cited the dangers associated with 
public perception of corruption, holding  that  
 
Congress could legitimately conclude 
that the avoidance of the appearance of 
improper influence “is also critical . . . if 
confidence in the system of 
                                                 
27 Kruse, 142 F.3d at 920.  While accepting the city’s argument that Buckley permits 
proof of new facts and new compelling governmental interests that would justify 
campaign spending limits, Judge Cohn voted to affirm the district court’s ruling, stating 
that the factual record was insufficient to uphold Cincinnati’s limits.  Judge Cohn did not 
explain why he viewed the record as insufficient, and his ruling on this point appears 
inconsistent with the standards governing review of a grant of summary judgment.  On a 
motion for summary judgment, a court may not weigh conflicting evidence; summary 
judgment is properly granted only “when there exists no genuine issues of material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (emphasis added).  Cincinnati presented facts 
going directly to Judge Cohn’s points concerning “the interest in freeing officeholders 
from the pressures of fundraising” and “the interest in preserving faith in our 
democracy.”  Having made this showing of genuine factual issues, the city should have 
been granted the opportunity to go to trial to prove its case, and Judge Cohn’s 
concurrence more logically should have been a dissent. 
28 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-38. 
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representative Government is not to be 
eroded to a disastrous extent.”29 
 
The Court nevertheless rejected the necessity of expenditure limits, 
expressing its faith , based on the record before it, that the contribution limits 
alone would be sufficient to address such governmental interests.  While the 
appellate court had ruled that “the expenditure restrictions are necessary to 
reduce the incentive to circumvent direct contribution limits,”30 the Supreme 
Court found: 
 
There is no indication [in the record] that the 
substantial criminal penalties for violating the 
contribution ceilings combined with the political 
repercussion of such violations will be 
insufficient to police the contribution 
provisions.31 
 
This pivotal passage from Buckley unambiguously reveals that a key 
empirical judgment -- drawn from the record -- ultimately determined the 
constitutionality of the congressional campaign spending limits.  For what if the 
record in Buckley had established that the “substantial criminal penalties” and 
the “political repercussion” were not sufficient to “police the contribution 
provisions?”  Clearly, Buckley leaves the door open for a different factual record 
which would justify the need for campaign spending limits.  The argument that 
campaign spending limits are a necessary concomitant to contribution limits was 
rejected by the Buckley Court only as a matter of fact.  
 
The Cincinnati record presented new facts and circumstances 
demonstrating the necessity for campaign spending limits to address the city’s 
interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption in the 
electoral process.  John Deardourff, a public opinion researcher with more than 
30 years of experience, documented a pervasive public perception of corruption 
in Cincinnati with respect to the city council election process.  The city 
demonstrated, through Mr. Deardourff’s affidavit, that this crisis in public 
confidence in Cincinnati with respect to the political system is directly tied to 
unlimited campaign spending.  Cincinnati residents “firmly believe that their own 
and others’ level of trust in the integrity of the political system has been eroded 
by the amount of money in politics.”32  An overwhelming majority of Cincinnati 
residents agreed with the statement, “The amount of money in election 
                                                 
29 Id. at 27, citing CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973). 
30 Buckley, 519 F.2d 817, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
31 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 56. 
32 R. No.38, Deardourff Affidavit at 9. 
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campaigns has caused me to lose a great deal of faith in the political system.”33 
 The record in Cincinnati thus demonstrated that public confidence in the 
system of representative government in Cincinnati has been “eroded to a 
disastrous extent,” and that contribution limits alone were insufficient to address 
this public perception of corruption.   
 
The city also presented crucial expert testimony that “the rise in the 
overall cost of city council races has caused a rise in the influence of wealthy 
donors in the City’s elections, with such donors increasingly dominating the 
campaign fundraising process.”   From 1991 to 1995, one-third of one percent 
of the metropolitan area’s population provided more than $3.9 million in 
campaign contributions to city council candidates, amounting to nearly 70% of 
all the money raised by those candidates.  The Buckley Court did not hear this 
type of critical evidence linking unlimited campaign spending with a 
corresponding rise in the influence of wealthy donors in elections. 
 
Like Cincinnati, the nation as a whole has witnessed the harmful impact 
of unlimited campaign spending in elections, despite the existence of 
contribution limits for federal elections.  In the twenty-two years since Buckley, 
the federal election experience has demonstrated that contribution limits will not, 
alone, sufficiently address corruption and the appearance of corruption in the 
electoral process.   
 
Recent public opinion polls confirm that citizens on all sides of the 
political spectrum perceive both actual and potential corruption in government 
under the current system of unlimited campaign spending.  Notably, in a 1996 
poll taken directly after the November elections, Americans ranked the "power of 
special interest groups in politics" second only to "international terrorists" when 
asked to identify "major threats" to the future of the country.34  The same poll 
revealed that the percent of people who feel the country is "losing ground" in its 
effort to fight political corruption has grown steadily over recent years.35 
                                                 
33 Id. at 10. 
34 Public opinion survey conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates on behalf 
of the Pew Research Center in conjunction with PBS series, The State of the Union 
(November 1996) <http://www.people-press.org/unionrpt.htm>. 
35The steady erosion of confidence in government is documented by numerous other 
polls: See THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1994, at 219 (1994) (finding that 49% of 
the public believe Congress is more corrupt than in 1974); Ronald G. Shafer, 
Washington Wire: Fundraising Flaps Roil the Administration Even as Clinton Backs 
Overhaul, WALL ST. J. , Jan. 31 1997, at A1 (citing survey results showing 68% of 
Americans believe politics more influenced by special interests today  than twenty 
years ago); see also JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, CONGRESS AS PUBLIC 
ENEMY:  PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS ,  6-7, 31-39 
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In a 1997 survey of the public's views on the impact of money in politics, 
sixty-six percent of respondents deemed the excessive influence of political 
contributions on elections and government policy a "major problem".  Sixty-five 
percent identified as another "major problem" the conflict of interest that occurs 
when politicians make decisions about issues of concern to those who fund their 
campaigns while seventy-one percent cited the good people being discouraged 
from running for office by the high cost of campaigns.36  
 
In a February 1997 Gallup poll for CNN-USA Today, fifty-three percent of 
voters said that "campaign contributions influence the policies supported by 
elected officials" a "great deal".37  Two months later, a separate poll determined 
that seventy-five percent of Americans believe that "public officials make or 
change policy decisions as a result of money they receive from major 
contributors."38 
 
More recently, in an August 1998 poll of voters in eight states, 
overwhelming majorities decried actual corruption and expressed desire for 
systemic reform.39  A sea change in attitudes has occurred, moreover, as voters 
now clearly perceive that their own senators are not immune from the corrupting 
influence of special interest contributions.  (Formerly, voters would decry 
corruption in Congress but disavow the suspicion that their own senators were 
guilty of ethical lapses.)  Between sixty-five and seventy-five percent of voters 
now believe that campaign contributions affect the votes of their own senators 
on issues of concern to special interests. 
 
Polling data uniformly demonstrates that the current campaign finance 
regime has devastated public confidence in government.40   Contrary to the 
                                                                                                                           
(1995). 
36 Public Opinion poll conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates on behalf of 
the Center for Responsive Politics, Money and Politics: A National Survey of the 
Public's View on How Money Impacts our Political System, (Center for Responsive 
Politics, 1997). 
37 Public opinion poll commissioned by CNN/USA Today and performed by Gallup 
(February 1997) (reprinted in Pacs, Parties, and Potato Chips: Myths and 
Misconceptions About Reforming the Campaign Finance System (Public Campaign 
1998)).  An additional 33% said contributions influenced officials a "moderate amount." 
38 Francis X. Clines, Most Doubt a Resolve to Change Campaign Finance Reform, Poll 
Finds, N.Y. TIMES,  Apr. 9, 1997, at A1; see also HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 
35, at 63-64 (indicating that 86% of the population believes that the government is 
controlled by special interests). 
39 Public opinion poll commissioned by Public Campaign and conducted by The 
Mellman Group, Inc. (August 1998) <http://www.publicampaign.org/poll9_3_98.html>. 
40 See generally David Schultz, Revisiting Buckley v. Valeo: Eviscerating the Line 
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Court's assurance that "substantial criminal penalties for violating the 
contribution ceilings" would suffice to "alleviat[e] the corrupting influence of large 
contributions,"41 the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness 
of the opportunities for abuse inherent in the present regime grows apace.  A 
danger the Court identified as a justification for drastic remedial action has 
obtained: "confidence in the system of representative government" has 
undeniably been "eroded to a disastrous extent."42 
 
The public’s view of the current system, moreover, is not based on 
imaginary fears.43  The federal experience teaches that the ingenuity of those 
who wish to purchase influence in government cannot be squelched by 
contribution limits alone.  Large aggregations of wealth still pour into campaign 
coffers under practices generally known as bundling.44  When individuals 
representing the same corporation, industry or special interest send 
contributions to a candidate at roughly the same time, they have circumvented 
the intent of existing contribution limits by bundling together far greater amounts 
than the law allows.   Candidates recognize the actual, unified source of this 
aggregated largesse and are thus subject to the same "corrupting influence of 
large contributions" that the Supreme Court reviled. 
 
Typically, a corporation will identify particular candidates and instruct its 
top brass and employees about where and when to send contributions.  Such 
organized bundling is difficult to monitor because "bundlers" are not required to 
identify their participation in aggregated donations.  By organizing bundles, 
institutionally related donors evade the important disclosure requirements that 
apply to PAC's, thereby denying the public critical information regarding 
attempts by special interest groups to affect public policy.  
 
                                                                                                                           
Betweeen Candidate Contributions and Independent Expenditures, 19 J. L. & POL. 33,  
93-00 (1998). 
41 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 55-56. 
42 Id. at 27 (quoting United States Civil Serv. Comm'n. v. National Ass'n. of Letter 
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)). 
43 Even officeholders, in their more candid moments, will confirm the stranglehold that 
money exerts on the political process.  See Marcus & Babcock; One Day on the Fund-
raising Trail: Dawn to Dark/Chasing the Dollars, THE BOSTON GLOBE, May 16, 1997, at 
A1, quoting U.S. Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia in a March 1997 Senate floor 
speech: “The incessant money chase that permeates every crevice of our political 
system is like an unending circular marathon.  And it is a race that sends a clear 
message to the people: that it is money, money, money that reigns supreme in 
American politics.”  Id. 
44 See, e.g., Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 4, at 1140-42 (1994); Raskin & Bonifaz, 
supra note.5, at 326-27 (citing LARRY MAKINSON, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS , 
OPEN SECRETS: THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONGRESSIONAL MONEY & POLITICS  (2d ed. 1992). 
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A notable example is MBNA, a Delaware banking and credit card 
corporation that ranked as the most profligate bundler of individual contributions 
in the 1994 election cycle and continues to organize substantial bundled 
donations today.  MBNA organized over $868,000 worth of bundled 
contributions to federal candidates in 1994, with the lion's share, roughly 
$500,000, going to four senators.45  Under existing contribution limits, an MBNA 
PAC would have only been able to donate a total of $30,000 to these four 
candidates ($5,000 per candidate per primary/election), as only three were 
contesting a seat. (Alfonse D'Amato was not running for election at the time, but 
became the Chair of the Senate Banking Committee as a result of the 
Republican shift in 1994.)  Through bundling, however, MBNA was able to 
amplify its message of corporate support by a factor of fifteen. 
 
Sixteen of the top fifty bundlers of contributions to federal candidates in 
the 1996 election cycle were securities and investment firms.  Collectively, the 
contributions doled out by the employees, officers and/or family members 
connected with these firms totaled over $4,420,000.  As a sector, the financial 
industry remains a dominant source of funding for federal candidates, especially 
through the evasive technique of bundling.  
 
The authors have received anecdotal accounts of the techniques 
corporations use to encourage their employees to contribute to the company 
PAC fund or directly to identified candidates.  These techniques include 
bonuses that reimburse the employee for the contribution or other incentives 
such as promises to match contributions to the employee's charity of choice.  
Strong evidence of these kinds of illegal, de facto contributions by corporations 
can only come from insiders who risk their careers by whistleblowing. 
 
Conduits are another method of aggregating individual contributions.   
Individuals, groups, or PAC's who collect and deliver contributions as conduits 
can take credit for (and exert influence by) amassing far more money than the 
law would allow them to give directly.  The Technet PAC collected and delivered 
to lawmakers at least $180,000 in the 1997-98 elections.  An example of their 
beneficiaries is Sen. Spencer Abraham (R-Mich.), sponsor of Technet backed 
legislation, for whom $19,500 was collected. 
 
Candidates also effectively solicit bundled contributions by establishing 
"Leadership PACs" -- alter-ego campaign committees that allow donors to 
double the size of their contributions.  Though Leadership PACs may not spend 
money directly on the sponsoring politician's campaign, they may cover 
"overhead" and the cost of related political activities (like pollsters and 
consultants) that contribute indirectly to the sponsor's success.  Leadership 
                                                 
45 All information regarding MBNA bundling available from the The Big Picture: Center 
for Responsive Politics (1998) <http://www.crp.org/pubs/bigpicture>. 
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PACs also collect funds that the sponsor may pass on to support the campaigns 
of political allies. 
 
The Sixth Circuit majority opinion in Kruse asserted that"[t]he problems 
uncovered on the federal level are explained primarily by the 'soft-money' 
loophole in contribution restrictions and do not undermine the Supreme Court's 
conclusion that spending restrictions are not narrowly tailored to addressing the 
problem of the corrupting nature of money in politics."46  There was, however, 
no record evidence supporting the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that the “soft-
money” loophole is the only, or even the primary, source of the system’s current 
problems.  While soft money contributions have indeed exploded over the last 
decade, soft money accounted for only eleven percent of the total amount of 
money spent in the 1996 federal elections.47   Accordingly, the courts cannot in 
good faith conclude that the corrupting failures of the present system are 
attributable to soft money alone and thereby ignore the corrosive effects of 
bundled contributions.   
 
C.  New Compelling Governmental Interests Justify Campaign Spending Limits. 
 
The Court in Buckley did not hold that there could never be a new and 
compelling governmental interest that would justify campaign spending limits.  
Rather, the Court stated: “No governmental interest that has been suggested is 
sufficient to justify [the congressional campaign spending limits].”48  The 
implication is clear.  The door remains open to compelling governmental 
interests that were not suggested to the Buckley Court.  This Court reaffirmed 
that point in NC-PAC, stating that “preventing corruption or the appearance of 
corruption are the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far 
identified for restricting campaign finances.”49   
 
Cincinnati presented two new and compelling governmental interests 
that justified its campaign spending limits.  First, the city has an interest in 
freeing its elected officials from the pressures of fundraising to ensure that they 
are able to carry out their representative duties without interference. 
 
The increasing amount of time elected officials spend raising money for 
their campaigns has fueled the erosion of public confidence in the democratic 
process in Cincinnati.  As the city’s Campaign Finance Advisory Board found in 
its final report to the Cincinnati city council, the time candidates spend raising 
                                                 
46 City of Cincinnati v. Kruse, 142 F.3d  907, 916 (6th Cir. 1998). 
47 See The Big Picture: Money Follows Power Shift on Capitol Hill (Center for 
Responsive Politics 1997). 
48 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 55 (1976) (emphasis added). 
49 FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 
(1985) (emphasis added). 
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money is directly tied to the rising costs of city council campaigns.  Instead of 
focusing on their responsibilities for governing the city, councilmembers must 
spend their time chasing the funds they need to compete in an unlimited “arms 
race” of campaign spending.50  A regime of unlimited campaign spending has 
had the same detrimental effect on officeholders’ attention to their duties at the 
federal level.51  The Buckley Court never addressed whether the compelling 
iterest in preserving officeholders’ time for carrying out their official duties would 
justify campaign spending limits, and Buckley therefore cannot be read as 
foreclosing reliance on this interest to support reasonable restrictions on 
campaign spending. 
 
Cincinnati also presented a new and compelling governmental interest in 
preventing some city council candidates from blocking other candidates’ access 
to key television advertising time.  In Cincinnati, city council candidates with 
large sums of money early in the election season are able effectively to shut out 
other candidates from broadcasting their messages on prime time television in 
the critical weeks leading to election day -- a “black-out” phenomenon.  The 
Buckley record did not include this crucial evidence.  
 
As explained in the expert testimony of an advertising executive with 28 
years of experience in the creation and production of television advertisements 
                                                 
50 See R. No. 38, Advisory Board Report at 4; R.No.38, Smith Affidavit at 4: “[T]he high 
costs of City Council campaigns today causes our City Councilmembers to spend too 
much time raising money for the next election, rather than focusing on their 
responsibilities on governing the city;” R.No.38, League of Women Voters Report,1: 
“More time than is reasonable is spent raising money for campaigns, which may 
interfere with time for governing”; Blasi, supra note 6, at 1283: “Legislators and 
aspirants for legislative office who devote themselves to raising money round-the-clock 
are not in essence representatives.” 
51 Blasi, supra note 6, at 1281: “Candidates for office spend too much time raising 
money.  This is scarcely a controversial proposition.” Id.  (citing sources on the 
burdens of fundraising in federal elections). See also MARTIN SCHRAM,  SPEEKING 
FREELY: FORMER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS TALK ABOUT MONEY IN POLITICS  37-46 (1995) 
(former Members of Congress discuss the enormous pressures of fundraising and its 
drain on their time for performing their official duties); DAN CLAWSON ET AL., MONEY 
TALKS: CORPORATE PACS AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE 7-8 (1992): “The quest for money is 
never ending . . . .  To pay for an average winning campaign, representatives need to 
raise $3,700 and senators $12,000 during every week  of their term of office.” Id.; PHILIP 
M. STERN,  STILL THE BEST CONGRESS MONEY CAN BUY 119 (1992)(quoting former 
Congressman Bob Edgar, a Pennsylvania Democrat who resigned from the House to 
avoid another campaign fundraising cycle: “Eighty percent of my time, 80 percent of my 
staff’s time, 80 percent of my events and meetings were fundraisers.  Rather than go to 
a senior center, I would go to a party where I could raise $3,000 or $4,000.”); 138 Cong. 
Rec. S115 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1987) 
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for Cincinnati city council candidates, well-funded candidates engage in media 
campaigns which “have the effect of preempting the right of other less well-
funded candidates from purchasing the most valuable advertising spots.”52  
Well-funded candidates in Cincinnati make excessive television advertising 
purchases at an early point in the campaign so that prime-time advertising is 
unavailable by the time other candidates have raised sufficient funds to 
purchase such ads.  The City’s campaign spending limits provided a means to 
break up this “effective monopoly on the most valuable advertising time.”53   
Under the reasonable spending limits adopted by Cincinnati, candidates would 
still be able to purchase substantial television advertising time, but would not be 
able to freeze out similar purchases by other candidates.   
 
The Buckley Court did not discuss whether government may act to 
regulate spending that is strategically designed to lessen the amount of 
information available to voters.  State and local governments should be free to 
protect all candidates’ access to  the marketplace of ideas by preventing the 
monopolization of important means of communication.  Indeed, in the related 
First Amendment area of television broadcasting, the Supreme Court recently 
reaffirmed the governmental interest in promoting the widespread dissemination 
of information from a multiplicity of sources.  In Turner Broadcasting System, 
Inc. v. FCC,54 the Court upheld the “must carry” provisions of the Cable 
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, declaring that 
“Congress has an independent interest in preserving a multiplicity of 
broadcasters to ensure that all households have access to information and 
entertainment on an equal footing with those who subscribe to cable.”  State 
and local governments surely have at least an equally important interest in 
preserving candidates’ access to a key medium of communication to the voters 
during a crucial period in the election campaign.55  
 
While the Sixth Circuit’s majority opinion in Kruse rejected the possibility 
that spending limits could ever be justified by new compelling interests not 
directly addressed in Buckley, Judge Cohn’s concurring opinion agreed with the 
city’s contention that Buckley did not foreclose that possibility.  Judge Cohn 
wrote: 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Buckley . . .is not a broad 
                                                 
52 Kruse, R. No. 38, Affidavit of Jerry Galvin at 4. 
53 Id. at 5. 
54 117 S.Ct. 1174, 1189 (1997). 
55 Cincinnati, of course, would not have had the power to address the “blackout” 
phenomenon by imposing “fairness” requirements directly on the television stations, 
given the Federal Communication Commission’s jurisdiction over regulation of 
broadcast media. 
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pronouncement declaring all campaign 
expenditure limits unconstitutional.  It 
may be possible to develop a factual 
record to establish that the interest in 
freeing officeholders from the pressures 
of fundraising so they can perform their 
duties, or the interest in preserving faith 
in our democracy, is compelling, and 
that campaign expenditure limits are a 
narrowly tailored means of serving such 
an interest.56 
 
As the first judicial recognition that Buckley does not forever foreclose 
the possibility of placing reasonable limits on campaign spending, Judge Cohn’s 
concurrence represents a substantial development in the legal movement to 
revisit the question of spending limits. 
 
D.  Avenues for Further Development of Challenges to Buckley   
 
The Supreme Court, by denying Cincinnati’s petition for certiorari in 
November 1998, passed on its first opportunity since Buckley to revisit the issue 
of spending limits.  The denial of certiorari in the first case to present the issue, 
however, does not necessarily signal that the door is forever barred, as a 
number of Supreme Court observers pointed out.57  The Court generally moves 
slowly in revisiting its prior decisions, even those that have received sustained 
criticism over time.  Reformers must be prepared to sustain a long-term effort to 
develop favorable cases and to pursue any necessary appeals, so that the 
Supreme Court will have further opportunities to review the question of spending 
limits. 
 
To maximize the chances of successfully defending spending limits, 
jurisdictions adopting such limits should pay careful attention to developing the 
factual record demonstrating why the limits are both reasonable and necessary. 
  It is particularly important that the limits be set at a level that clearly permits 
candidates to communicate effectively with the electorate and to run viable 
campaigns, taking into account the costs of media, direct mail, and other 
campaign costs in the jurisdiction.  In Cincinnati, the limit of $140,000 was 
deemed by the district court to be more than sufficient to run a viable campaign, 
thus obviating one of the most important potential barriers to the defense of 
                                                 
56 Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 920 (6th Cir. 1998). 
57 See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Reject Appeals in Two Cases Involving Limits on 
Political Money, THE NEW YORK TIMES, November 17, 1998 at A11; Edward Felsenthal, 
High Court Demurs on Campaign Funds, WALL STREET JOURNAL, November 17, 1998 
at B11. 
16
Akron Law Review, Vol. 33 [2000], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol33/iss1/3
1999] BUCKLEY V. VALEO  
 
spending limits.  While such a finding will not, as Kruse demonstrates, 
necessarily assure final victory in the courts, an unreasonably low limit will 
almost certainly lead to quick defeat.      
 
The defense of spending limits also requires careful attention to 
demonstrating that lesser measures, such as contribution limits alone, have 
been or are likely to be insufficient to curb corruption and the appearance of 
corruption.  If a jurisdiction has had contribution limits in place for a number of 
years, public opinion polls showing continued pervasive concern about the 
influence of money on their elected officials will be extremely useful, and 
perhaps indispensable, in documenting the necessity for more effective 
measures.  Specific instances of influence-peddling or evasions of contribution 
limits, if available, provide additional factual support for spending limits.  Careful 
documentation of the need to preserve officeholders’ time from the pressures of 
fundraising is important, especially in light of Judge Cohn’s concurring opinion in 
Kruse finding this interest to be new and compelling.  The testimony of 
candidates, political consultants, and other actors familiar with electoral politics 
in the jurisdiction is also valuable in documenting why expenditure limits are 
necessary.  Demonstrating that dramatic growth in campaign spending has 
been accompanied by growing numbers of  elections in which no one comes 
forward to challenge the well-financed incumbent further illustrates the 
antidemocratic effect of unlimited spending, supporting the need for reform. 
 
The stage is already set for additional test cases that will give the courts 
the opportunity to revisit the question of spending limits.  In 1997, the State of 
Vermont enacted campaign spending limits for its state elections to take effect in 
the 2000 election cycle, along with a comprehensive system of voluntary public 
funding for candidates running for governor and lieutenant governor.58  
Vermont’s action is significant, because it means that a state legislature has now 
placed its weight behind the necessity of spending limits to curb the corrupting 
influence of money and to assure that elected officials will devote their time to 
governing rather than fundraising.  The proponents of Vermont’s new law plan 
to mount an aggressive defense to an expected constitutional challenge to be 
filed after the law goes into effect in November 1998.  
 
Since 1974, the City of Albuquerque has maintained limits on campaign 
expenditures for its local elections, making it the only major city in the country 
with sustained experience with campaign spending limits in operation.59  Last 
year, a mayoral candidate and three campaign contributors filed suit in state 
court seeking to strike down the limits on Buckley grounds and obtained a 
preliminary injunction preventing the enforcement of the limits in the October 
                                                 
58 VT. STAT . ANN. 17 § 2805a  (effective November 4, 1998). 
59 Albuquerque, N.M. Charter, art. XIII, § 4. 
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1997 municipal elections.60  The city, recognizing the emerging movement for 
revisiting Buckley, retained the National Voting Rights Institute to defend its 
limits.  In August 1998, the plaintiffs withdrew their complaint, with the 
unsuccessful mayoral candidate citing his lack of interest in running for local 
office again.  With the limits back in place, the city, with the Institute, is preparing 
to defend against an anticipated new lawsuit.  Albuquerque’s unique posture as 
the only major city with 20 years’ actual experience with spending limits makes it 
a particularly valuable test case for revisiting Buckley.  Albuquerque’s record 
shows that spending limits have encouraged electoral competition in city 
elections, with numerous instances of challengers mounting successful 
campaigns against incumbents.61 
 
In July 1995, the Supreme Court of Ohio revised its judicial code of 
ethics to set campaign spending limits for that state’s judicial elections.62  A 
group of judicial candidates promptly challenged the limits in federal court as 
violative of the First Amendment, relying on Buckley. The Ohio Attorney 
General’s Office defended the limits as justified by a new compelling 
governmental interest in protecting the impartiality of the state judiciary, an 
interest not presented to, and therefore not addressed by, the Buckley Court.  
Twenty-two states joined an amicus brief in support of the limits at the appellate 
court level.  The brief, co-authored by the Iowa Attorney General’s Office and 
the Institute, argued that judicial elections are distinguishable from legislative 
elections, and, in the alternative, that if Buckley is to be applied, the ruling 
should be reconsidered in light of new facts and circumstances. 
 
A three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit  recently affirmed a district court judgment invalidating the judicial 
campaign spending limits, rejecting the argument that restrictions on judicial 
elections should be judged by different and more lenient standards than those 
applicable to elections for legislative and executive office.63  The Sixth Circuit’s 
ruling, unfortunately, also placed the case in an awkward posture for review by 
the United States Supreme Court, because the Sixth Circuit’s substantive ruling 
addressed a set of limits that had been revised by the Ohio Supreme Court 
during the course of the litigation and were no longer in effect.  The Sixth Circuit 
did not rule upon the constitutionality of Ohio’s revised spending limits, leaving 
that issue to be determined by the district court on remand.  The Ohio Attorney 
General, on behalf of the state supreme court, filed an unsuccessful petition for 
                                                 
60 Murphy v. City of Albuquerque, No. CV-97-7826 (Second Judicial District of New 
Mexico). 
61 See Dana Milbank, Renewed Battle Brewing on Campaign Spending Caps, THE 
WALL STREET JOURNAL, March 24, 1998, at A24; Robert Zausner, Campaign spending 
limit?  In Albuquerque, It’s Old Hat, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, October 23, 1998, at A21. 
62 Supreme Court of Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon VII(C)(6). 
63 Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 890 (1999). 
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certiorari before the Supreme Court.  The constitutionality of the new limits, 
accordingly, is subject to further litigation in the district court and court of 
appeals.  If the new limits are again struck down by the lower courts, as 
anticipated, the stage will be set for a second effort to obtain Supreme Court 
review, this time without the distraction of a procedural bar to consideration of 
the merits. 
 
II.  REVISITING THE REJECTED BUCKLEY GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS 
 
In addition to the new interests presented in Kruse, the Court should 
reconsider certain justifications for campaign spending limits that it summarily 
dismissed in Buckley.  Primary among these is the claim that spending limits are 
necessary to achieve the political equality that is essential to a just democracy 
and guaranteed to all citizens under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Without some guarantee of equal political opportunity, 
wealth has and will continue to debase our democracy.  Another argument 
deserving reconsideration is the notion that campaign spending should be 
viewed as communicative conduct and not as ‘pure’ speech.  When the Court 
mistook money for speech in Buckley, it applied too strict a standard to marginal 
abridgements of a purported ‘right to spend’ and mistakenly conferred upon 
campaign war chests the absolute protection of the First Amendment.  Instead, 
the Court should have analyzed spending limits according to the line of cases 
that allow partial abridgement of First Amendment rights in the form of time, 
place and manner restrictions, or alternatively, as necessary regulation of a 
scarce communicative resource.  In this last vein, advocates should also 
encourage the Court to bring careful scrutiny to the “free market of ideas.”  
Detailed attention to the actual business of campaigns will inform a more 
nuanced understanding of the real market for electoral speech.  Competition in 
this marketplace could then be fruitfully analyzed—and protected—under 
established principles of antitrust law.  
 
A.  Political Equality 
 
Scholars have criticized many aspects of the Court’s muddled analytical 
framework in Buckley.  Yet, few phrases in that decision have subdued 
subsequent prudential and legislative debate more than the Court’s famous 
dictum that “the concept that government may restrict the speech of some 
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly 
foreign to the First Amendment”.64  A survey of American political philosophy 
and legal precedent reveal that this claim is overblown, if not, as one scholar 
observed, “demonstrably incorrect”.65  While the Buckley Court chose summarily 
                                                 
64 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976). 
65 David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1369, 1383 (1994). 
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to subordinate political equality to the First Amendment, many scholars, jurists, 
and philosophers see political equality as “the cornerstone of American 
democracy”.66 
Even at a time when the franchise was denied to many citizens, 
American constitutional thought recognized “establishing a political equality 
among all” as the primary remedy to political evils.67  As James Madison 
famously noted: 
 
Who are to be the electors of the 
Fœderal Representatives?  Not the rich 
more than the poor; not the learned 
more than the ignorant; not the haughty 
heirs of distinguished names, more than 
the humble sons of obscure and 
unpropitious fortune.  The electors are 
to be the great body of the people . . .68  
 
Modern philosophers place an even higher value on political equality.  
John Rawls, for instance, recognizes that the “fair opportunity to take part in and 
to influence the political process” is not merely an aspiration of a just 
constitutional democracy, but rather a precondition.  Noting that “[t]he liberties 
protected by the principle of participation lose much of their value whenever 
those who have greater private means are permitted to use their advantages to 
control the course of public debate,” Rawls argues that universal suffrage alone 
is inadequate to preserve a just system when “the political forum is so 
constrained by the wishes of the dominant interests that the basic measures 
needed to establish just constitutional rule are seldom properly presented.”69   A 
failure to compensate for the disproportionate effects of wealth in politics thus 
undermines the value of voting.70    
                                                 
66 J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an 
Obstacle to Political Equality? 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 625 (1982); see also A. 
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT  10-11 (1948); J. 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-19, 205-07, 221-28 (1971); Scanlon, A Theory of 
Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 214 (1972); A. DE TOQUEVILLE, 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 59, 474 (J.P. Mayer & M. Lerner eds., G Lawrence trans. 
1966). 
67 JAMES MADISON, 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 197 (Robert A. Rutland et al. 
Eds., 1983); see also FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 305 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke, ed. 1961). 
68 FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 385 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke, ed. 1961). 
69 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 221-228 (1971). 
70 Rawls' conclusion is particularly chilling when compared to the Court's own 
observation that "[o]ther rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is 
undermined."  Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). 
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The First Amendment cannot protect speech rights to the exclusion of all 
other values.  In numerous contexts, the Court has upheld restrictions on the 
speech of some elements of society in order to protect other communal 
interests.71  The Buckley Court’s “ritual incantation of the notion of absolute 
protection” for the quantity as well as the content of political expression cannot 
be squared with political reality, nor is it supported in theory.  Rawls effectively 
dismisses the Court’s First Amendment absolutism by noting that “basic liberties 
constitute a family, and that it is this family that has priority and not any single 
liberty itself”.  “[P]olitical speech,” he concludes, “even though it falls under the 
basic liberty of freedom of thought, must be regulated to insure the fair value of 
political liberties.”72  Alexander Meiklejohn recognizes that some regulation of 
political speech in the name of political equality is necessary for the orderly 
presentation and intelligent deliberation self-government requires.73  Similarly, 
Ronald Dworkin deems the Buckley dictum rejecting the interest in political 
equality a “mistake because the most fundamental characterization of 
democracy—that it provides self-government by the people as a whole—
supposes that citizens are equals not only as judges but as participants as 
well.”74  Dworkin urges that Buckley be overruled because its “rigid rule is not 
just an inconvenience but a serious loss in the quality of the very democracy” 
that rule supposedly protects.75   Thus, even as a matter of pure theory, 
preservation of the conditions under which free speech may take place cannot 
be wholly foreign to the First Amendment. 
This notion is not merely an academic exercise, but has found 
expression in the courts as well.  In his dissent in Bellotti, Justice White argued 
that some level of political equalization is in fact required by the First 
Amendment: “The Court’s fundamental error is its failure to realize that the state 
regulatory interests in terms of which the alleged curtailment of First Amendment 
rights . . . must be evaluated are themselves derived from the First 
Amendment.”76  In the Bellotti context -- the attempted limitation of corporate 
spending on ballot initiatives that had no direct effect on the corporation’s 
business -- the value of promoting free political debate required the prevention 
of corporate domination.  Justice White recognized that the issue is not whether 
                                                 
71 See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 
(1965); City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984); 
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); City of Renton v. 
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 
781 (1989); Barnes v.  Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). 
72 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 356-63 (1993). 
73 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 66, at 23. 
74 Ronald Dworkin, The Curse of American Politics, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, 
Oct. 16, 1996, at 19, 23. 
75 Id. at 22. 
76 First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 803-04 (1978). 
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First Amendment rights may be abridged at all but instead whether the state has 
chosen “the best possible balance” between “competing First Amendment 
interests.”77   
Indeed, it is crucial to remember that marginal regulation of campaign 
contributions and expenditures does not effect real political equality.  In the 
context of contribution limits, one thousand dollars still represents a substantial 
sum of money.  Most working persons simply do not have sufficient disposable 
income to contribute anywhere near the limit, even if they feel tremendous 
passion about the candidates in question.  Accordingly, contribution limits 
marginally encourage, but do not guarantee, real equality of input in the political 
system.  Similarly, raising the floor through public election financing or capping 
the ceiling through spending limits will not equalize the output of all political 
voices.  At best, such a regime would prevent certain candidates from 
monopolizing communications media while giving less wealthy candidates a 
basic, meaningful opportunity to campaign before the general public.  
 
Creating a ceiling on expenditures does not raise the floor for those 
whose economic status precludes even the most basic forms of mass political 
communication.  A reform law that employs both spending limits and public 
financing would more comprehensively serve the interest of political equality.  In 
Vermont, the new spending and public financing regime that is set to take effect 
in the year 2000 will, once challenged, offer just such a test case for the courts, 
allowing advocates to set forth arguments regarding the factual circumstances 
and civic interests that justify comprehensive campaign spending limitations.  
The Vermont legislature specifically found that mandatory spending limits were 
necessary to protect the viability of the public funding program they had also 
devised.  In contrast, some jurisdictions that provide for elective public funding 
allow candidates to abandon or supplement the public funding program when an 
opposition candidate spends beyond certain limits.  Such opt-out provisions, of 
course, may undermine the purpose of public funding statutes by leaving them 
vulnerable to any non-participants who elect to instigate an escalating spending 
contest.  Vermont, by contrast, opted to pre-empt war chest competition (and its 
consequent debasement of political discourse) by protecting its public financing 
statutes with mandatory spending limits.  In doing so, Vermont created a 
regulatory regime that effectively serves the interest of political equality, thereby 
presenting a test case through which to reevaluate that principle. 
Also, the modern Supreme Court’s seminal rulings striking down wealth 
discrimination in the electoral process are rooted in the principle of political 
equality.  In 1966, two years after the Twenty-Fourth Amendment banned poll 
taxes in federal elections, the Court in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections78 
                                                 
77 Id. at 804-12 (White, J., dissenting); see also id. at 825-27 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
78 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
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invalidated a poll tax of $1.50 in Virginia state elections.  The Court found that: 
 
a State violates the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
whenever it makes the affluence of the 
voter or payment of any fee an electoral 
standard.  Voter qualifications have no 
relation to wealth . . . .79 
 
In Bullock v. Carter,80 the Court again recognized the “real and 
appreciable impact on the exercise of the franchise” which voters face under a 
system that excludes them on the basis of their lack of wealth.  In Bullock, the 
Court struck down filing fees ranging from $150 to $8,900 that the state of 
Texas required primary candidates to pay to their political parties.  The Court 
found that “the very size of the fees imposes under the Texas system [gave] it a 
patently exclusionary character.”81  The fees violated the equal protection rights 
of both voters and candidates.  Prospective candidates without wealth were 
precluded from seeking office, and the fees thus limited voters’ choices of 
candidates and burdened less affluent voters more heavily.  As the Court noted: 
 
Many potential office seekers lacking 
both personal wealth and affluent 
backers are in every practical sense 
precluded from seeking the nomination 
of their chosen party, no matter how 
qualified they might be, and no matter 
how broad or enthusiastic their popular 
support.82   
 
“[W]e would ignore reality,” the Court continued, “were we not to 
recognize that this system falls with unequal weight on voters, as well as 
candidates, according to their economic status.”83  In Lubin v. Panish, the Court 
struck down California’s $701.60 filing fee for county supervisor election, ruling 
that filing fees do not “test the genuineness of a candidacy or the extent of the 
voter support of an aspirant for public office.”84  “[O]ur tradition,” the Court 
noted, “has been one of hospitality toward all candidates without regard to their 
                                                 
79 Id. at 666. 
80 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972). 
81 Id. at 143. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 144. 
84 415 U.S. 709, 717 (1974). 
23
Bonifaz et al.: Buckley v. Valeo
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2000
 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1 
 
economic status.”85   
 
Many have compared Buckley to the notorious, pre-New Deal case 
Lochner v. New York, which relied on an idealized notion of the freedom of 
contract to strike down maximum hour labor laws.86  As in Lochner, the Buckley 
Court relied on idealized notions of a free marketplace of ideas to strike down 
reasoned attempts to preserve basic democratic values.  To persuade the Court 
that it has erred, advocates must shed light upon the discontinuities between 
the Court’s idealized view of politics and the reality that we have endured over 
the past twenty years.  Defenders of our present plutocratic electoral system 
elide the substantial relationship between government enforcement of a free 
market economic regime and the distribution of access to speech in the political 
arena.87  Some even resort to a form of latter-day red-baiting by insisting that 
reformers want government to “enter the business of redistributing both 
economic and political power.”88  Aside from such deliberate misrepresentations 
of the scope and effect of reform proposals, such arguments ignore the fact that 
the economic inequality begets political inequality.  Even if one agrees that 
government should not allocate economic resources in the private realms of 
property and contract, such a conclusion has no bearing on a government’s 
duty to constitute itself through just electoral procedures, in which each citizen 
has a meaningful opportunity to participate.  Only if one assumes that money is 
speech does the enforcement of political equality raise re-distributive questions. 
 To say that each of us enjoys the right to amass as much wealth as birth, 
talent, and luck bestow is not to say that we may use that wealth to dominate the 
process of democratic deliberation.  
While spending limits may not necessarily render the voices of all 
contestants absolutely equal, they nonetheless serve the interest of political 
equality by making the prospect of political participation more realistic for a 
                                                 
85 Lubin, 415 U.S. at 717-718.  In M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, (1996), the Court 
recently reaffirmed its landmark holdings in Bullock, Lubin, and Harper.  “The basic 
right to participate in political processes as voters and candidates cannot be limited to 
those who can pay for a license.”  Id. (citing Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); 
Lubinv. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974);  Harper v. Virginia Board of Election, 383 U.S. 
663 (1996)). 
86 Lochner, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); See also JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 362-63 
(1993); DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUION 219 (1986); CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 97-98 (1993). 
87 See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments, 
Intractable Dilemmas, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1262-66 (1994) (rejecting Professor 
Sunstein's imputation of state action in creating and preserving existing distributions of 
wealth); Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of 
Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L. J. 1049 (1994). 
88 BeVier, supra note 87, at 1266. 
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greater number of citizens.  This compelling rationale alone offers ample 
justification for their adoption.  By broadening access to the marketplace of 
ideas, spending limits not only ameliorate the present state of political inequality 
but also enrich the diversity and depth of civic discourse.  As set forth below in 
section B, such an understanding of spending limits concords with established 
First Amendment doctrine regarding the protection of key political processes 
through carefully tailored regulation. 
 
B.  Money and Speech  
 
The central obstacle to regulation of campaign spending is the Court’s 
widely criticized equation of money and speech.89  The objections to this 
equation are legion, and will not be rehearsed here.  It suffices to note that the 
Buckley decision equivocates on this very point.  The Court approved 
contribution limits on the theory that a contribution “serves as a general 
expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not 
communicate the underlying basis for support.”  Hence, the “quantity of 
communication does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution.”90 
 If money is, in fact, meaningful speech, this cannot be true: a contribution of 
one dollar must mean something different from a contribution of a million.  
Conversely, under the Court’s rejection of spending limits, spending ten million 
dollars to repeat a television ad ten thousand times must mean something 
significantly different from running that same ad one hundred times—an 
extremely doubtful proposition.  Clearly, the correlation between spending and 
speech is not absolute.  Within certain limits, spending arguably bears a high 
correlation with meaningful speech (e.g., running an ad enough to achieve a 
basic saturation, quantifiable as a gross market share rating); but beyond such 
limits, spending takes on the attributes of conduct, as in Cincinnati, where better 
financed candidates purchased all available advertising space well in advance 
of the election season, effectively preventing opposition candidates to use the 
medium of television themselves.  
 
Of pressing concern to the reform advocate is the challenge of lending 
empirical support to the notion that campaign spending cannot be deemed pure 
speech.  Any empirical data tending to rebut the alleged correspondence of 
spending to ideas will bolster the argument that campaign spending is properly 
understood as a form of conduct related to speech.  Studies analyzing the 
content (or lack thereof) as well as the effect of repetition in political advertising 
could prove helpful in this regard.  Such data, in turn, will allow advocates to 
                                                 
89 See generally J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 
YALE L. J. 1001 (1976). 
90 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976). 
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urge courts to apply the more flexible First Amendment analysis applicable to 
speech-related conduct outlined in United  States v. O’Brien.91  
 
In a related vein, advocates should challenge the Buckley Court’s 
decision that spending limitations cannot be sustained as reasonable time, 
place and manner regulations which do not discriminate among speakers or 
ideas.  This analysis was rejected by the Court because92 the Buckley Court 
assumed that more spending must mean more speech, i.e. more substantive 
contribution to issues of public concern. 
   
A restriction on the amount of money a 
person or group can spend on political 
communication during a campaign 
necessarily reduces the quantity of 
expression by restricting the number of 
issues discussed, the depth of their 
exploration, and the size of the audience 
reached.93 
 
This statement, however, does not bear up well when examined under 
the light of experience.  Political campaigns are dominated by thirty and sixty 
second television ads that contain a negligible amount of reliable information 
and typically involve either oversimplified vitriol concerning the opponent’s 
failings or anodyne montage associating the candidate with sunrises and smiling 
babies.  More critically, as Ronald Dworkin argues, repetition, the hallmark of 
television ad campaigns, does not improve collective knowledge on issues of 
public import.94  As Judge Skelly Wright observed, “[m]oney may register 
intensities . . . but money by itself communicates no ideas.”95 
The most forceful analogy in the line of cases dealing with time, place 
and manner restrictions is the truck-mounted loudspeaker at issue in Kovacs.96  
There, the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting the use of loud and raucous 
loudspeakers to broadcast messages on city streets.  While the decibel limits in 
Kovacs were upheld on account of the nuisance they created, spending limits 
serve a far more critical interest.  The Buckley Court distinguished Kovacs and 
                                                 
91 391 U.S. 367 (1968).  The Buckley Court rejected an O'Brien analysis of campaign 
finance reform with little analysis.  By mistaking "suppressing communication" for 
suppressing a particular message, the Court ignored the fact that spending limits cap, 
but do not preclude communication, as well as the fact that more campaign spending 
does not necessarily lead to more communication. 
92 424 U.S. at 18. 
93 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19. 
94 See Dworkin, supra note 72, at 22. 
95 See Skelley Wright, supra note 66, at 1004. 
96 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). 
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other time place and manner restrictions in an unconvincing manner, noting that 
“expenditure limitations impose direct quantity restrictions on political 
communication and association.”97  As Judge Skelly Wright observed, this 
distinction is untenable, as the time, place and manner regulations can also be 
seen as quantity restrictions on speech.98  In the Kovacs context, muted 
loudspeakers would reach a far more limited number of citizens. 
 
C.  Reasonable Regulation of a Limited Resource: The Marketplace of Ideas  
 
Traditional First Amendment discussions often begin by allusion to the 
inviolable right of citizens to assemble in public parks to speak their minds.  But 
the park analogy does not reflect the reality of political communication in the 
modern era.  Reconciling this inexact analogy with existing system of unequal 
access to the dominant media of mass communication would entail certain grim 
realizations: the “park” is actually owned by (regulated) private companies who 
charge a fee for those who wish to mount their soapbox.  Furthermore, to the 
extent that the poor may enter the “park” to speak, they may place their 
soapboxes only in the marshy swamps where the public rarely strays.  Their 
voices fail to reach those gathered, of necessity, in the well-traveled pathways.  
The din of wealthy men with bullhorns and amplifiers drowns out all hope of 
effective communication with the public at large.   
 
With these images in mind, it is incumbent on those who seek reform in 
the courts to demonstrate empirically that the media used in political speech are 
in fact limited.  For example, in Kruse, the City of Cincinnati assembled data to 
support the argument that television advertising space in city elections is subject 
to a “black-out effect.”99  It is critical to note in this regard that the limited 
resource in question is in fact the access to viewers and not to air time.  
Theoretically, with the advent of digital transmission and cable services, there is 
an immense capacity for transmitting multiple channels into households.  But as 
every advertising consultant knows, the critical determinant of the value of an 
advertising spot is the ratings share of the program it accompanies.  There are 
a finite number of households with televisions and the value of a given 
advertisement spot is determined by the proportional share of total households 
tuned into a broadcast at a given time.  Network sales agents and advertisers 
rely upon the scientific quantification of viewership provided by independent 
rating services like the Nielsen Service when negotiating the price of different 
spots.100  Free market idealists would deny that there exist meaningful limits to 
                                                 
97 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 18. 
98 See Skelly Wright, supra note 66, at 1010-11, n. 41. 
99 See supra text and accompanying notes 50-51. 
100 See Turner Broadcasting, 520 U.S. at 232-33 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  In her 
dissent in Turner Broadcasting, Justice O'Connor appears to acknowledge that the 
critical issue in the analysis of the First Amendment value of televised communication 
27
Bonifaz et al.: Buckley v. Valeo
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2000
 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1 
 
communicative resources on the naïve assumption that demand for the public’s 
attention will always engender new supply.  This premise, however, is flatly 
contradicted by the market data used in the real world to assign value to the 
limited space available for televised political speech.  
 
The Court made clear in Red Lion Broadcast. Co. v. F.C.C. that, when a 
medium of communication is limited, the government cannot help but abridge 
the speech rights of some to allow effective communication in that medium to 
take place.101  In Red Lion, the Court unanimously upheld the FCC’s fairness 
doctrine, noting that “[t]he right of free speech of a broadcaster, the user of a 
sound truck, or any other individual does not embrace a right to snuff out the 
free speech of others.”102  Drawing on the public’s interest in receiving a 
diversity of viewpoints, the Court held that “[b]ecause of the scarcity of radio 
frequencies, the Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor 
of others whose views should be expressed in this unique medium.”103  Clearly, 
the abridgements of free speech rights approved in Red Lion (the denial of 
broadcast licenses) are more extreme and profound than those incidental to 
campaign spending limitations.  When the state allocates broadcast licenses to 
a special minority of applicants, “the rest must be barred from the airwaves.”104   
“[T]o deny a station license because ‘the public interest’ requires it ‘is not a 
denial of free speech’.”105  Analogously, the question is not whether the state 
can properly limit the amount of spending on campaigns, but rather how can the 
state preserve the rights of all classes in society to participate in self-
government.  If, as the Court stated in Red Lion, “the right of the public to 
receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas ¼ 
may not constitutionally be abridged . . . by Congress,”106 then surely it may not 
be abridged by a wealthy minority who exercises economic control over the 
means of mass communication. 
 
Antitrust law also recognizes that markets cease to function efficiently 
when dominated by firms with inordinate market share.  Innovation and 
accountability disappear when the price of entry for new competitors becomes 
too large.  The Court has unequivocally established that “promoting fair 
                                                                                                                           
is viewership: "[w]hether cable poses a 'significant ' threat to a local broadcast market 
. . . depends on whether viewers actually watch the stations that are dropped or 
denied carriage."  Id.  Analogously, whether wealthy candidates pose a significant 
threat to poor candidates depends on whether viewers actually watch the programming 
alongside which poorer candidates can afford to advertise. 
101 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Fed. Comm. Comm’n., 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969). 
102 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 387. 
103 Id. at 390. 
104 Id. at 389. 
105 Id. (quoting National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943)). 
106 Id. at 390. 
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competition is a legitimate and substantial Government goal.” 107  In Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Fed. Comm. Comm.,108 four justices concluded that 
must carry provisions of the Cable Act of 1992, which undeniably burdened the 
First Amendment rights of cable operators, were in part justified by the 
deleterious effect that an absence of such provisions would have on the 
economic survival of local broadcast stations.  The Supreme Court also 
reaffirmed the governmental interest of promoting the widespread dissemination 
of information from a multiplicity of sources.109  In the area of elections, citizens 
surely have at least an equally important interest in preserving candidates’ 
access to a key medium of communication to the voters during a crucial period 
in the election campaign.110 
 
The law is fond of analogy, not only for its rhetorical heft, but also for its 
power of elucidation.  In Buckley, the Supreme Court resorted to analogy to 
justify its absolute rejection of limits on campaign expenditures, likening such 
limits to a deprivation of fuel for a car: “Being free to engage in unlimited political 
expression subject to a ceiling on expenditures is like being free to drive an 
automobile as far and as often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline.”111  
This casual metaphor deserves scrutiny, as it both reveals and obscures crucial 
aspects of the present unjust system of political participation. 
 
The misconceived car trope rests upon a host of assumptions that are 
entirely in conflict with political reality.  What makes our present electoral system 
so tragic a violation of the constitution’s promise of equal protection is the fact 
that the vast majority of Americans cannot afford a go-cart, much less a car, nor 
can they pay the tolls to access the highways of public discourse.  And for those 
who can scrape up enough cash to ride the roads of civic debate, the political 
highway is already jammed by the thundering semis and SUV’s of the wealthy.  
The Court’s metaphor perhaps unintentionally concedes the two essential 
features of the present political landscape: a) the limited resource of 
communicative “space”; and b) the wealth barrier to entry. 
 
As with arguments concerning political equality, advocates must address 
                                                 
107 Turner Broadcasting, 520 U.S. at 232 (O'Connor, J. dissenting). 
108 Turner Broadcasting, 520 U.S. at 180 (1997).  
109 See id. (upholding the “must-carry” provisions of the Cable Television Consumer 
Protection and Competition Act of 1992: “Congress has an independent interest in 
preserving a multiplicity of broadcasters to ensure that all households have access to 
information and entertainment on an equal footing with those who subscribe to 
cable.”). 
110 Cincinnati, of course, would not have the power to address this phenomenon by 
imposing “fairness” requirements directly on the television stations, given the Federal 
Communications Commission’s jurisdiction over regulation of broadcast media. 
111Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 n.18 (1976). 
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both the theoretical and empirical errors in the Court’s assumptions about 
access to and competition within the marketplace of ideas.  A basic tenet of the 
moral justification for free markets, as identified by its proponents from Adam 
Smith through Milton Friedman, is the equality of opportunity (as distinguished 
from equality of outcomes).  When, however, money is mistaken for speech, 
relative poverty becomes a very real and quantifiable barrier to entry in civic 
discourse.  Once one acknowledges that ideas are the only acceptable specie 
in the marketplace of ideas, one must accept equality of access to the arena of 
political debate as the sine qua non of a morally justifiable constitutional system. 
 Advocates must marshal such arguments, armed with empirical data about the 
actual operation of political speech in specific media, to persuade the Court to 
abandon its staunch, formalistic opposition to campaign spending limits. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
As the most recent decision sounding in campaign finance makes plain, 
the members of the present Court share little agreement on the basic principles 
at stake in proposed regulation of campaign spending.112  Members of the Court 
have expressed dissatisfaction with Buckley, albeit for differing reasons, and 
have suggested that the time to revisit the case approaches.  Advocates of 
reform should view this discord and confusion as an opportunity to proffer new 
evidence and analyses that challenge the long-held misconceptions about our 
political reality.  
The Court has invited proponents of campaign finance reform to prove 
that change is necessary.  In Bellotti, the Court noted that if the case for reform 
“were supported by record or legislative findings that corporate advocacy 
threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes”, it would merit 
consideration as a compelling interest justifying government regulation of 
campaign spending.  As canvassed above, the evidence is available; indeed, it 
has become difficult to ignore.  Reform advocates must be prepared to support 
state legislatures and city councils that have the foresight to make the case for 
reasonable expenditure limits and the political courage to defend such limits in 
the face of court challenges.  Through such efforts, we can hope that Buckley’s 
conflation of money with speech will eventually join the constitutional curiosity 
shop on the shelf next to poll taxes 
 
                                                 
112 See Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election 
Comm'n., 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996); see also Anthony Corrado et al. CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK 65-66 (1997). 
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